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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 910155-CA

s

JESUS A. SEPULVEDA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No, 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence
seized in a warrantless, consensual search of defendant's
vehicle.

The factual findings underlying the trial court's

ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal
unless they are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the
trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings,
the appellate court applies a correction of error standard of
review.

State v. Caver. 814 P.2d 604, 610 (Utah App. 1991).

Accord United States v. Butler. 904 P.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir.
1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jesus A. Sepulveda, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991) (R. 2). After the trial
court denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized,
a jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 22, 26-41, 70-74, 131).
The tri^l court sentenced defendant to a term of one to
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and imposed various fines
and fees (R. 150). The trial court then suspended defendant's
sentence and imposed a 36 month term of probation (R. 150-51).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For purposes of the issue raised on appeal, the
pertinent facts are those set out in the trial court's ruling
denying defendant's motion to suppress (R. 70-74) (a complete
copy of the court's decision is contained in addendum D).
trial court found as follows:
From the testimony given it appears that the
following facts are those testified to by the
Trooper and not contested by any other
witness since no one else was called by the
State or the defendant.
Trooper Mangelson testified that he first
observed the defendant vehicle which was a
Camaro (a stylish General Motor sports car)
but that it had an expired Utah registration.
2

The

Upon effecting the stop the officer asked the
defendant for a driver's license and
registration which the defendant was unable
to produce. The defendant claimed the
vehicle belonged to his friend and was being
used to return to Utah since the vehicle they
went to California in broke down. The
defendant could not give [the] name of his
friend who ow[n]ed the vehicle nor an
address.
The officer noted that as the conversation
with defendant extended he observed the
defendant reacting in a very nervous and
visibly shaking manner. After being asked if
the vehicle was carrying any drugs or
firearms and responding [M]no,["] the trooper
asked if he could search the vehicle to which
he said ["]go ahead.[u]
The officer requested the passengers to exit
the vehicle at which time they did and he
frisked them for weapons, and found a small
marijuana pipe in the pocket of a juvenile
who was a passenger in the vehicle. The
defendant did not have a key to the trunk[,]
but got access to it for the search through
use of a screw driver. While searching the
vehicle the officer noted screws that had
paint wear marks on them indicating some form
of recent use and lead [sic] to the discovery
of a compartment under the seat wherein one
kilo of cocaine was retrieved.
It is also noted that the testimony presented
by the trooper was to the effect that a
wom[a]n passenger in the subject vehicle had
taken the trooper aside and indicated to him
that she was an agent for the D.E.A. and that
there was contraband in the car after which
the officer proceeded to the discovery
through the compartment under the seat to
which access was obtained through use of the
screwdriver on the wore [sic] screws.
(R. 70-72, see Addendum D).

Based on the above findings, the

trial court concluded as follows:
The two paramounts [sic] considerations that
this set of facts give rise to are whether or
not there was probable cause for the stop of
3

the vehicle, and a subsequent search of it.
There is also an issue to whether or not the
defendant under the circumstances of this
case had any standing to object to the
officer searching the vehicle aside from the
probable cause question, and lastly whether
or not a consent was obtained to search the
vehicle by the trooper from the defendant.
The court concludes that the facts in this
case support the right of the trooper to
proceed with a search of the vehicle under
all of the above issues.
As to the initial stop of the vehicle, the
only testimony presented indicates that there
was no valid Utah registration presented for
the car which showed a violation of the
registration laws which justified the officer
in making the stop which would not be
unreasonable under the circumstances of the
expired registration observed by the officer.
The fact that after the stop the defendant
could not produce a drivers [sic] license nor
could he give any ownership information other
than that it was a friend[']s car whose name
he could not give nor whose address he could
give would justify the officer in proceeding
with additional questions which the
uncontroverted testimony shows that consent
was given for the vehicle search and no
evidence would support a showing of the
consent being coerced or in any manner
otherwise unlawfully obtained.
It would appear under the totality of the
circumstances after the initial stop and
learning from a third party in the vehicle
who was identified as a D.E.A. operative was
a direct statement to the officer that there
was contraband in the vehicle which occurred
prior to obtaining the consent[,] or at least
proceeding with the search would certainly
give probable cause under exigent
circumstances, the detention being on a
highway some distance from a source for
obtaining a search warrant would certainly
give probable cause to the officer to
proceed. The fact that the consent was given
would clearly confirm the actions of the
officer in going into areas that he deemed
4

suspicious within the car in locating the
contraband.
Based on the foregoing analysis on the basis
of evidence presented only by the trooper,
there has been no showing that the search was
unreasonable, and to the contrary it appears
that the record shows it to be a reasonable
search under the circumstances presented by
this case.
Defendant's motion to suppress is denied[.]
(R. 70-72, see Addendum D).
As noted in the court's ruling, defendant presented no
evidence at the suppression hearing, nor did he make any legal
argument before the court (Transcript of suppression hearing,
October 3, 1990, [ST.] at 3-24) (a copy of the suppression
hearing transcript is contained in Addendum C).
Although defendant renewed his motion to suppress at
trial, he did not articulate any new grounds for suppression or
otherwise argue the merits of his motion before the court and the
motion was again denied (T. 43, 73).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The grounds for objection to evidence must be
distinctly and specifically stated in the trial court before this
Court will review those grounds on appeal.

Because defendant

failed to challenge the legality of his detention and the
trooper's reliance on his nervous behavior in the proceedings
below, he has waived consideration of these issues on appeal.
The only cognizable issue before this Court concerns
the voluntariness of defendant's consent to search.

However,

because defendant's argument on appeal is devoid of relevant
5

legal or factual analysis, does not identify any error by the
court below, and neglects to outline the issue with sufficient
specificity to allow the State to respond, his argument does not
merit review.
Additionally, the trial court found that defendant
lacked standing to contest the vehicle search.
not challenge this finding on appeal.

Defendant does

Thus, even if this Court

were to look past defendant's waiver of these issues, he lacks
standing to complain of the vehicle search.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S FAILLE TO ARTICULATE ANY
ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
DETENTION AND THE TROOPER'S RELIANCE ON HIS
NERVOUS DEMEANOR IN THE TRIAL COURT
CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF THESE ISSUES ON
APPEAL
In Point I of his brief defendant argues that his state
constitutional rights1 were violated because the trooper lacked
"reasonable suspicion to detain him or subsequently search his
vehicle" (Br. of App. at 5). In BDint II of his brief defendant
argues that his nervous behavior during the stop did not create
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify his detention

1

Defendant's reliance on state constitutional
provisions, both in the trial court and in Point I of his brief
on appeal, is nominal and lacks any argument as to why this Court
should engage in a separate state constitutional analysis. See
R. 40 (Addendum #); Br. of App. at 5. Thus, this Court need not
analyze defendant's arguments under state constitutional
provisions. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 n.4 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v.
Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988).

6

or the search of his vehicle (Br. of App. at 7-8). However,
defendant failed to articulate these particular arguments in the
trial court and has thus failed to preserve them for review.
Absent special justification for failing to present all
available grounds in support of a suppression motion, this Court
will not rule on those grounds not addressed in the trial court.
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Carter,
707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985).

The law recited by defendant

in Points I-II of his brief on appeal was available for
presentation to the lower court.

The record fails to indicate

any reason for defendant's failure to raise these arguments.
At the suppression hearing, defendant cross-examined
Trooper Mangelson, but failed to pinpoint any issue or present
any argument to the court regarding his detention or nervousness
(ST. 3-24, see Addendum C). Moreover, defendant did not address
either of these issues in his written motion to suppress, or in
his supporting memorandum (R. 22, 26-41) (copies of defendant's
motion to suppress and supporting memorandum are contained in
Addendums A and B). Rather, defendant argued that the evidence
should be suppressed because the warrantless search was conducted
without probable cause or consent in violation of his
constitutional rights (R. 22-23, 29-40, see Addendums A and B).
Although defendant renewed his motion to suppress at trial, he
again failed to pinpoint any issue or present any argument to the
court (T. 43, 73). Because defendant failed to raise these
7

particular issues before the trial court, the court made no
determination thereon, and defendant has waived them for
consideration on appeal.

Price, 827 P.2d at 248; Archambeau, 820

P.2d at 922; Carter, 707 P.2d at 660-61.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE CITATION AND
ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT AUTHORITY AND FACTS
PRECLUDES APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE
VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS CONSENT TO SEARCH
In Point III of his brief defendant asserts that his
consent to search was both involuntary and resulted from the
trooper's exploitation of the alleged illegal detention (Br. of
App. 9-10).

However, as demonstrated in Point I of this brief,

defendant failed to articulate any argument concerning the
legality of his detention in the trial court.

Rather, defendant

argued that he did not consent to the vehicle search or,
alternatively, that his consent was involuntary (R. 22, 26-41,
see Addendums A and B).

Thus, defendant's assertion on appeal

that his consent was obtained through the trooper's exploitation
of the alleged prior illegal detention has not been preserved for
review.

State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 (Utah App. 1992);

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991); State v.
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985).
The only cognizable issue before this Court concerns
the voluntariness of defendant's consent to search.

However,

defendant's argument on appeal consists merely of a legal
citation concerning the state's burden for proving voluntary
consent and a rhetorical statement questioning the intelligent
8

nature of his consent (Br. of App. 9-10).

His argument is

otherwise devoid of relevant legal or factual analysis, and is
thus meaningless.

The Rules of Appellate Procedure require that

a brief on appeal include an argument which "shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on."

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).

Because defendant's argument fails to comply with the briefing
rule, lacks any meaningful analysis, does not identify any error
by the court below, and neglects to outline the issue with
sufficient specificity to allow the State to respond, his
argument does not merit review.

Price, 827 P.2d at 248-50; State

v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Amicone,
689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
Additionally, the trial court found that defendant
lacked standing to contest the vehicle search (R. 72, see
Addendum D).

Defendant does not challenge this finding on appeal

(Br. of App. at 5-10).

Thus, even if this Court were to look

past defendant's waiver, he lacks standing to complain of the
vehicle search.

State v. Atwood, 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34 n.l

(Utah App. May 12, 1992) (proponent of a motion to suppress has
the burden of establishing that his own constitutional rights
were violated by the challenged search and seizure).

9

CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &M

day of June, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

^M_

CER
jistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Milton T. Harmon, attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 97, Nephi,
Utah

84648, this cff

day of June, 1992v

pitM
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

C M * ©1 DttWe* Court, Jusb Cou

FILED

APR 41950

MILTON T. HARMON #1373
Attorney for the Defendant
36 South Main Street
P.O. Box 97
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (801) 623-1802
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

r

Case No.
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

JESUS A. SEPULVEDA,
Defendant.

A ?(f -Z)

MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

:
: Judge

Comes now the Defendant and moves the above-entitled court to
suppress evidence seized in the search of the vehicle in which the
Defendant was riding at the time of his arrest.
This motion is made for the reason that the State alleges that
a search of the subject vehicle was made with the consent of the
Defendant.

That, in reviewing the matter with the Defendant, he

has advised counsel that he did not give such consent, nor did the
officer have probable cause to search the vehicle.
Therefore, the Defendant requests that hearing be had upon
this motion to determine if appropriate consent was given and, if
there was no consent given, that all evidence seized in the search
of the vehicle be suppressed and not be admitted as evidence in any
proceeding hereafter.
DATED this <&/

day of March, 1990.

f-M^
SO&ML
'MILTON T.'4iARM0N
Attorney for the

Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion to Suppress Evidence to: Mr. Donald J. Eyrer Jr./
Juab County Attorney, 125 North Main Street, Nephi, UT 84648 and
Mr. Jesus A. Sepulveda, 1146 South 500 East, Apt. #4, Salt Lake
City, UT 84102; first-class postage prepaid, this ^ /
day of
March, 1990.

ADDENDUM B

MILTON T. HARMON #1373
Attorney for the Defendant
36 South Main Street
P.O. Box 97
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (801) 623-1802
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

JESUS A. SEPULVEDA,

Criminal No. 296-D
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

:

Defendant.

Judge George E. Ball if

Comes now the defendant and submits the following Memorandum
in support of his Motion To Suppress:
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
1.

The defendant, while traveling on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah,

on January 30, 1990, was stopped by officer Paul Mangelson, of the
Utah Highway Patrol.

The vehicle driven by the defendant was in

all respects, being operated in an appropriate and legal manner.
But the vehicle registration was good only through the month of

OfB

December, 1990. The expired registration was the ostensible reason
for the stop.

Although, officer Mangelson did testify that based

upon his extensive experience in drug interdiction, the defendant,
and the car in which he was traveling did meet a "loose" drug
courier profile, i.e. sporty general motors car, (Camero) traveling
in a northerly direction on 1-15, and driven by persons of SpanishMexican origin, and that this profile caused his initial suspicion.
2.

The defendant, as the officer observed when he began to

converse with him, spoke Spanish. The defendant speaks Spanish as
his primary language, and can speak and understand a "little"
English.
3. After an initial inquiry about drivers license, registration, and destination, defendant was directed to exit the vehicle.
The officer indicates that there was a discussion about the vehicle
owner.

The defendant had borrowed the vehicle for a trip from

California to Utah.
4.

As the officer conversed with the defendant, he noted he

was visibly shaking. The officer obviously attributed this conduct
to the defendant's wrongdoing, ignoring an obvious response of the

2

ai

defendant to the cold weather.

The officer had the car occupants

exit the vehicle and began a search.
5. At this point the officer became suspicious and determined
to conduct an investigatory search and inquiry.

He suspected,

because of the loose profilef as recited above, the defendant's
shaking, and disturbed paint on the screw head which secured the
seat back, and his prior experience with similar vehicles containing drugs in the vent area, that the defendant was transporting
illegal drugs.
6.

The officer then said he asked for permission to search

(to look into) the vehicle.

His recollection is that permission

was given by words as "go ahead".

The officer testified, he then

asked the defendant to step from the vehicle.

The vehicle was in

part dismantled by the seat back cover being removed. Cocaine was
discovered in the area.
7. The officer testified that the defendant did not entirely
understand the officer during the course of these events, and had
to rely in part upon a passenger, who as it turns out was a state
law enforcement agent, interpreting for him.
3

as?

The defendant denies

that he was asked for, or gave permission to search or look into
the vehicle.
ISSUES:
The primary issue of the legality of the search and seizure,
all done without a warrant.

In the absence of a warrant the State

must rely upon A. Probable cause, or B. Consent.

The defendants

contend that neither circumstance is present, thus the search and
seizure were not proper and the result should be suppression of the
cocaine as evidenced in the criminal prosecution.

These issues

will be addressed in the above Order.
A. Was there probable cause to allow a search
and seizure without a warrant?
1.

It is well settled under Utah law that the determination

of probable c^se requires a close examination of facts in each
individual case State v. Earl 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986).
2.

The facts in this case upon which the State can rely to

constitute probable cause are as follows:
a.

The subject car was a sporty general

motors car.
4

a<i

c.

The car was traveling

in a northerly

direction on Interstate Highway 15.
d.

The defendant

shaking

when

clad in a T-shirt, was

exposed

to

the

cold

January

temperatures.
e.

The seat back cover on the driver's side

was fastened with a screw, and the paint on
this screw head had been disturbed.
f.

The investigating officer had prior ex-

perience with general motors cars being driven
on 1-15 where drugs were located in the area
of the seat back.
g.

The occupants of the vehicle were of

Spanish-Mexican origin.
3.

It must certainly be admitted that any one of the above

factors, standing alone, would not constitute probable cause. This
is for the reason that each listed item is a perfectly legal act.
The next question is, do these facts, by reason of their combination, constitute probable cause.
5

The defendant asserts that they

do not.

There is nothing unique about these set of facts that

would indicate probable cause.

The conclusion is based upon an

analysis of cases where the Utah Courts have found probable cause.
Briefly, in all such cases there had been some sign of an independent illegal act, such as an odor of marijuana, or visible drug
paraphernalia. See the following instructive cases where probable
cause has been found:
State v. Earl, supra, these facts were found to exist.

1.

Strong odor of marijuana coming from the interior of the vehicle.
2.

Defendants were driving a rental car after flying to Arizona

from Utah, suggesting he was a drug courier.
fresheners.

4.

3.

Strong air

A loaded firearm, readily accessible to the

defendants. 5. A quantity of controlled substances and paraphernalia were found in the vehicle when it was stopped.

£•

The

defendants told the officer that additional marijuana was probably
located in the car. All of these objective facts were known to the
officer prior to the search being conducted.
that they constituted probable cause.

6
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And the court found

State v, Dorsey 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986), where the court
found objective facts to justify the ultimate conclusion that there
was probable cause: 1.

The officers were attempting to make a

controlled buy of a large quantity of cocaine,

2.

The suppliers

had cocaine in the LaQuinta Motel in rooms 131 and 137.

3. That

someone involved in the transaction was wearing a dark leather
jacket.

4.

That someone wearing a dark leather jacket was seen

in the motel parking lot carrying a bag and behaving suspiciously.
5. That after the deal was called off, the persons in room 131 and
137 left the motel.

One wearing a dark leather jacket.

6.

That

these two persons walked from the motel directly to a silver truck
with license plates containing the numbers 3535.

The officer

stopped this truck and conducted a search where cocaine was found.
Other cases could be cited but the above cases are excellent
for the general example given.

And based upon this example

defendants contend that the factors available to the officer in
the case now before the court do not rise to the basis for probable
cause.

7
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B.

Was there a valid consent to search and

seize?
1.

There is a conflict in the testimony regarding consent.

The officer said consent was received.

The defendant denies that

he gave consent. This may be explained by the language used by the
defendant.
Spanish.

The officer spoke in English and did not understand
The defendant, spoke fluently in Spanish, and a little

in English.
2.

With these circumstances in mind, let us look at some

legal interpretation and guidelines regarding consent to search a
vehicle:
3.

In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), the

United States Supreme Court examined the "consent exception" to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

In that case, the

court noted that one of the well-established exceptions to the
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment is
a search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent.

The question

dealt with was what must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that
a consent was "voluntarily" given.
8
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4.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that the

"voluntariness" required for a consent to search should be the same
as the voluntariness showing required in a police interrogation,
i.e. miranda warning and waiver of rights.

The court however

stated that any coercion, explicit or implicit, would negate a
voluntary consent.

In making such proof the government need not

show that the person had been specifically warned of his right to
refuse to a consent to a search.

The court also rejected the

defendant's claim that the consent to search was like a waiver of
a constitutional right at a criminal trial. It was stated that the
test to be applied is the traditional test of voluntariness. That
is the prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the consent
was freely and voluntarily given and was not the result of duress
or coercion. Voluntariness, it was held, is a question of fact to
be determined from all the circumstances.
5.

The court then discussed some of the factors to be

considered when applying this totality of the circumstances test.
These include; the defendant's intelligence, whether or not the
defendant was in custody, the nature of the police questioning and
9
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the environment in which it took place, the defendant's knowledge
of his right to withhold consent, and any other circumstances that
weigh on the issue of voluntariness.
6.

This issue of coercion as it relates to a consent to

search has also been addressed by the Supreme Court in other contexts.
7.

In Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), it was held

that a stop of an individual on less than probable cause cannot
justify a detention in a small room by two police officers.

The

officers had retained the defendant's airline ticket and identification.

They then had his luggage brought to the room where

he was held.

The court found that such a situation would result

in the defendant's belief that he was under arrest.

Because the

defendant had not been informed that he was free to board his plane
and he actually believed he was being detained, it was held that
the encounter had lost its consensual nature.

The court went on

to hold that, as a practical matter, Royer was under arrest. Since
there was no probable cause to arrest him, the search was illegal,

10
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and the evidence was ordered suppressed.

The court then made some

observations about the nature of searches based on consent:
" . . . where the validity of a search rests on
consent, the State has the burden of proving
that the necessary consent was obtained and
that it was freely and voluntarily given, a
burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere
submission to a claim of lawful authority."
8.

The Court Of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a

similar issue in United States v. Racaldey 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir.
1985).

In that case, the defendant had been stopped for speeding

in New Mexico.

He produced a Virginia driver's license.

The car

was not registered to the defendant. The officer ran an NCIC check
to determine if the vehicle had been reported as stolen.
check was negative.

That

He then requested assistance from a backup

officer stating that he had a "gut instinct" that the defendant was
transporting narcotics.

The officer returned to the defendant's

car and told Recalde he could either plead not guilty or sign the
ticket.

When it was signed, the officer asked the defendant to

step out of the car and then requested to inspect the trunk.
During the inspection, the officer found that some of the screws

11
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in the molding had been tampered with. The officer then requested
that the defendant accompany
defendant agreed to do.

him to a nearby town which the

At no time had the officer returned the

defendant's driver's license, the vehicle registration, or the
traffic ticket.

At the police station the defendant consented to

the search of the car.
9. In analyzing the issue of whether the search was made with
the defendant's consent, the Tenth Circuit employed a three tier
analysis.

It was described as follows:
"First, there must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was unequivocal and
specific.
Second, the government must establish that the consent was given without
duress or coercion.
Finally, we evaluate
those first two standards with a traditional
indulgence of the courts against a presumption
of waiver of constitutional rights." at 1453.

10.
obtaining

In determining
consent

the issue of duress or coercion in

to search, the

Supreme

Court

Of

described a number of factors that should be considered.
v. Whittenback.

Utah has
In State

621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the court stated:

"Clearly the prosecution has the burden of
establishing from the totality of the circumstances that the consent was voluntary
12
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given; howeverf the prosecution is not required to prove that defendant knew of his
right to refuse. Factors which inay show a
lack of duress or coercion include: 1) The
absence of a claim of authority to search by
the officers: 2) The absence of an exhibition
of force by the officers; 3) A mere request
to search; 4) Cooperation by the owner of the
vehicle; and 5) The absence of deception or
trick on the part of the officer." [Footnote
omitted] at 106.
11.

Several other Utah cases have held that the question

regarding a Fourth Amendment violation turns on the issue of
reasonableness.

State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978); State

v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975); State v. Kaae, 30 Ut. 2d 73,
513 P.2d 435 (Utah 1973).

Under the test, courts are to balance

the interests of society against that of the individual. The court
would typically describe this test as follows:
"In regard to the propriety of the search; it
is to be had in mind that the constitutional
protections are only against unreasonable
searches. The test to be applied is whether
under all of the circumstances, fair-minded
persons, giving due consideration to the
rights and interest of the public, as well as
to those of the suspect, would judge the
search to be an unreasonable intrusion into
the latter's rights.
A further important
observation is that the just-stated test to
gauge the validity of a search without a
13
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warrant is satisfied if consent is given to
the search, as was done here; and that these
rules apply even when the suspect is in custody." [Footnotes omitted] State v. White,
supra, at 553-554*
However, in State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981), three of
the justices expressly rejected the White holding, as it failed to
comport with the requirements of the United States Supreme Court's
rulings on the Fourth Amendment. The majority of the court adopted
the standard that searches not made pursuant to a valid warrant
were per se unreasonable, and subject to the sell delineated
exceptions.
12.

In the present case there is conflicting evidence on the

issue of whether or not the defendant voluntarily consented to the
search. This evidence must be weighed in light of the presumption
^gainst

waiver

of

a

constitutional

right.

Furthermore,

as

previously described, the state bears the burden of proving that
there was in fact a voluntary consent to the search of the car.
13.

The final point to be considered regarding consent

relates to the extent of the consent, or the area to which consent
would relate, if there were in fact consent.
14
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In respect to this

matter, the defendants represent that if the court should find that
there was a consent, that consent was just to look into the
vehicle, and would not extend to an examination of the vehicle by
removing mechanically fastened vent covers, the turning of screws,
etc.

See State v. Marshall, Utah Court Of Appeals, case number

890121-CA, filed December 26, 1989.

A copy of this Opinion is

attached hereto
CONCLUSION:
Based upon the facts of this case, a reasonable interpretation
of the law, the cocaine seized from the seat back compartment
should be suppressed for the reason that the search and seizure
were conducted without a warrant, in violation of the defendants
Federal, State and Constitutional rights, and that the State has
not met its burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that an
exception to the warrant requirement existed.
Respectfully submitted this

^rr^t

day of October, 1990.

MILTQ« T. HARMON
Attorney For The Defendant
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BILLINGS, Judge:
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr. Marshall"), was
charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pre-trial
motion to suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized from the
rental car he was driving when he was arrested. The trial court
denied Mr. Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory
appeal. We reverse.
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure of the contraband
in detail as the legal issues presented are fact sensitive.
State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery ("Trooper Avery") was driving
on Interstate 70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's
vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a motor home. Trooper
Avery observed that Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking
for approximately two miles after he passed the motor home. Mot
knowing whether Mr. Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the signal on, Trooper

4x

Avery pulled the vehicle over to inform Mr. Marshall of the
problem and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper Avery had
issued similar warning citations for turn signal violations
approximately five to ten times in the previous six-month period.
Prior to stopping Mr* Marshall, Trooper Avery noticed the
vehicle had California license plates. He approached Mr.
Marshall's vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn signal
problem. Mr. Marshall responded that he had been having "a hard
time keeping the thing turned off."
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his driver's license and
vehicle registration. Mr. Marshall produced a New York driver's
license and a California rental agreement for the vehicle. Mr.
Marshall said he was going skiing in Denver and planned to return
the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental agreement
indicated that the car would be returned in New York in five days.
Trooper hv&fy acknowledged he became suspicious that Mr.
Marshall might be transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr.
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car where he issued a
warning citation for "Lights, head, tail, other." Trooper Avery
then returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the rental
agreement.
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying
alcohol, drugs or firearms. Mr. Marshall stated he was not.
Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could "look inside
the vehicle." Mr. Marshall responded, "Go ahead." Trooper Avery
and Mr. Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's vehicle. The
passenger door was locked and Mr. Marshall reached in on the
driver's side to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a small
red bag on the floor of the vehicle and asked if he could open
it. Mr. Marshall agreed. No contraband was found inside the bag
or the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall had a key to the
trunk and if Mr. Marshall would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall
attempted to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly that
Trooper Avery had to assist him by holding the key latch cover up
while Mr. Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw four
padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall opened the trunk. Trooper
Avery asked Mr. Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr.
Marshall responded "clothes." Trooper Avery then asked if he
could look in the suitcases. Mr. Marshall immediately reversed
his statement and responded that the suitcases were not his and
must have already been in the trunk when he rented the vehicle.
Trooper Avery testified there was some play in the zipper of one
bag and he unzipped it far enough to see a green leafy
substance. Trooper Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for
possession of a controlled substance.
890121-CA
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Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any evidence to
contradict Trooper Averyfs testimony during the hearing below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
-[W]e will not disturb the trial courtfs factual evaluation
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
unless it is clearly erroneous.* State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972,
974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). £££ also State v. Walker. 743 P.2d
191, 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). Further, *[t]he trial court's finding is clearly
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence
or if [the appellate court] reach[es] a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made," State v. Serv. 758
P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
STANDING—EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
The state argues that we need not reach the issues asserted
by Mr. Marshall that Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall was an
unconstitutional pretext, or that his consequent detention
exceeded constitutional limits, or that Mr. Marshall did not
voluntarily consent to the search of the suitcases found in the
trunk of his rental car. As a threshold argument, the state
claims that Mr. Marshall lacks standing to challenge the seizure
of the suitcases as he disclaimed any ownership or possessory
interest in the suitcases both during the search and subsequent
to his arrest and, thus, had no expectation of privacy in their
contents.1 See Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128, 138-50 (1978);
State v. Valdez. 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); State v.
Grueber. 776 P.2d 70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. DeAlo,
748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The fatal problem with the state's argument is the state
raises standing for the first time on appeal. The Utah Supreme
1. The state relies upon the following testimony from the
preliminary hearing:
Q.

And what was inside the trunk?

A.

There were four suitcases.

Q.

Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases?

A.

Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly,
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have
been in there when he rented the car.

890121-CA
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Court recently squarely held that standing to challenge the
validity of a search under the fourth amendment •'is not a
jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a substantive doctrine that
identifies those who may assert rights against unlawful searches
and seizures.- State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah
1989). Citing the general rule that a substantive issue or
"claim of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,"
the court deemed the issue of standing waived. Id. at 1138-39•
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, claiming that in
Schlosser the state not only failed to laise the issue of
standing in the motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal.
We do not find the distinction determinative. We believe the
Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to protect the defendant
from being required to deal with new legal issues on appeal when
he had no warning of the necessity to develop the relevant facts
below.
In this case, the state, the defendant, and the trial court
all focused on the issue of voluntary consent to search the
suitcases, not standing to assert a privacy interest in the
suitcases. The defendant may well have chosen to testify at the
motion to suppress hearing to contradict the trooperfs testimony
that he had disclaimed owwrrship of the suitcases had the state
chosen to litigate the issue of standing below.
In Steaoald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the United
States Supreme Court also refused to allow the government to
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time
on appeal. The Court refused to allow the state to claim that
the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the house searched
as a ground for sustaining the lower court's ruling denying a
motion to suppress when the state had not made this claim at
trial. The Court concluded:
The Government, however, may lose its
right to raise factual issues of this sort
before this Court when it has made
contrary assertions in the courts below,
when it has acquiesced in contrary
findings by those courts, or when it has
failed to raise such questions in a timely
fashion during the litigation.
i£. at 209.
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Thus, we conclude that the state may not for the first time
on appeal claim that Mr. Marshall lacks standing to assert a
privacy interest in the contraband seized 2 to uphold the trial
court's denial of the motion to suppress.

2. Our conclusion may seem at odds with the general rule that we
"may affirm the trial court's decision on any proper grounds,
even though the trial court assigned another reason fox- its
ruling.- State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). We
agree with the general rule, but find the issue of fourth
amendment standing to be unique. Fourth amendment standing
involves more than simply applying another legal principle to
sustain an evidentiary ruling. The failure to raise a fourth
amendment standing claim is more analogous to the failure to
plead and try an affirmative defense or an attempt to assert a
new theory of recovery for the first time on appeal. See
Banoerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) (-It is
axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties in
the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.-);
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(defendant cannot raise constitutional issues for first time on
appeal); Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1005 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (defendant cannot raise affirmative defense for first time
on appeal); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (-matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at
the trial may not be raised for the first time on appeal.-);
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.. Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 637 n.2
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (matters not presented to trial court prior
to summary judgment cannot be raised for first time on appeal).
The state asserts fourth amendment standing to validate what
otherwise would be an unconstitutional search. The defendant
must have an opportunity to factually meet this defense to an
unconstitutional search.
Furthermore, although the Utah Supreme Court applied the
waiver of fourth amendment standing rule to uphold the trial
court's granting of a motion to suppress in Schlosser. the court
relied on State v. Goodman. 42 Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057
(1985), which held the state could not raise the issue of
standing for the first time on appeal to provide an alternative
ground for sustaining the trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress. Ifi. at 1060.
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PRETEXT STOP
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper Avery used the fact
that his turn signal was malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his
vehicle to search for evidence of drug trafficking.
The protective shield of the fourth amendment applies when an
officer stops an automobile on the highway and detains its
occupants. State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). A police officer may constitutionally stop a citizen on
two alternative grounds. First, the stop "could be based on
specific, articulable facts which, together with rational
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person
to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a
crime.- Id. (citing Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State
v. Christiansen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Truiillo,
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Second, the police
officer can "stop an automobile for a traffic violation committed
in the officer's presence." Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977. However,
an officer may not use a traffic violation stop as a pretext to
search for evidence of a more serious crime. I&.
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. Marshall's vehicle
to investigate his hunch that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved
in drug trafficking, we determine whether a hypothetical
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances
confronting him or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to issue
a warning for failing to terminate a turn signal. I&. at 978.
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Averyfs stop of his vehicle is
similar to the stop we found unconstitutional in Sierra. We
disagree. In Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was that
the driver remained in the left lane too long after passing a
car. In this case, Trooper Avery perceived an equipment problem
with Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to turn it off.3
Courts consistently have held that a police officer can stop a

3. While the warning citation does not specify which provision
of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, the state asserts that
his conduct was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117(1)
(1988) which, with our emphasis, provides:

890121-CA
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car when he or she believes the car's safety equipment is not
functioning properly.4
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra, Trooper Avery was
not suspicious of Mr* Marshall for other reasons before the stop,
had not followed him in order to find seme reason to pull him
over, and, before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle.
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall's
vehicle was not a pretext, but was a valid exercise of police
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's vehicle was functioning
properly.

(Footnote 3 continued)
It is a misdemeanor for any person to
drive or move or for the owner to cause or
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on
any highway any vehicle or combination of
vehicles which is in such unr.afe condition
as to endanger any person, 01 which does

not contain those parts or is not 9t all
times equipped with lamps and other

equipment in proper condition and
adjustment • • • •
4. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1979), the
United States Supreme Court st ted that an officer has a duty in
the interest of highway safety to stop vehicles for safety
reasons. "Many violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements
are observable, and something can be done about them by the
observing officer, directly and immediately." Id. at 660. The
Court inferred that as long as an officer suspects the driver is
violating "any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and
equipment regulations," the police officer may legally stop the
vehicle. Id* at 661.fififiTownsel v. State, 763 P*2d 1353, 1355
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court held stop justified when vehicle's
headlight was out, a tail light was broken, the license plate and
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. Puia. 112 Ariz.
519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) (suspicion of defective turn
signals justified stop); State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me.
1989) (stop justified when blinking headlights led officer to
stop vehicle for safety reasons).
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UNREASONABLE DETENTION
Next, Mr. Marshall complains generally that the extent of his
detention and the scope of Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded
constitutional limits*5 Again, we disagree.
Once a driver is lawfully stopped, an officer may inquire as
to information about the driver and the vehicle "reasonably
related in scope to the justification- for the detention. United
States v. Briononi-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (quoting Terrv
v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)).
The United States Supreme Court has not chosen to define a
bright-line rule as to the acceptable length of a detention
because -common sense and ordinary human experience must govern
over rigid criteria.- United States v.. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 685
(1985). The Court has chosen to focus, not on the length of the
detention alone, but on -whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant.- Id. at 686.
In Sharpe. the Court found that a twenty-minute detention
after a highway stop for suspected drug trafficking was not
excessive where the officer examined the driverfs license,
examined his ownership papers, requested and was denied
permission to search the camper, and then stepped on the rear
bumper, noting that it did not move, thus confirming his
suspicion that it was overloaded. Id. at 687. The Court
distinguished this reasonable detention from those involved in
Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Florida v. Rover. 460
U.S. 491 (1983); and United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696 (1983),
stating that it was not the length of detention, but the events
which occurred during the detention which transformed the

5. We do not analyze this issue under article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution as the state constitutional issue was not
sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis
provided on appeal as to why our analysis should be different
under Utahfs constitution. BS& State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326,
327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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investigative stops in these cases into a "defacto arrest*- ifi.
at 683-86.6
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten
minutes of stopping Mr. Marshall. Based upon the facts obtained
during routine questioning and issuing the warning citation, the
officer became suspicious that Mr. Marshall was involved in
transporting drugs. He returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license,
the car rental agreement and the citation. Trooper Avery then
asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs
in the vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper
Avery immediately asked for permission to look into the vehicle
and received Mr. Marshall's consent.
We find that Trooper Avery's initial investigation was within
the scope of his traffic stop and that Trooper Avery's immediate
request to search the vehicle and his expeditious completion of
the search did not constitute an unreasonable detention.
Furthermore, Mr. Marshall was not moved to another location nor
treated in a manner to support a finding of a "defacto arrest."
CONSENT
Finally, Mr. Marshall argues that even if his initial stop
and subsequent detention were not constitutionally deficient, the
subsequent search of the suitcases found in the trunk of the
vehicle without a warrant violated his fourth amendment rights.
The state contends, on the other hand, that Mr. Marshall
consented to the search of the suitcases and thus Trooper Avery9s

6. Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (defendant taken
from neighbor's home, tiansported unwillingly to police station,
was subjected to custodial interrogation for one hour until he
made incriminating statements); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983) (defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized, then he
was taken to a small room where he was questioned and his luggage
inspected); United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
(defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized for 90 minutes
to take it to narcotics detection dog for "sniff test," police
knew of arrival time and should have had the dog on hand).
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search of the suitcases and subsequent seizure of the mariiuana
without a search warrant was constitutionally permissible.'
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is
conducted as a result of the defendants voluntary consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); St9te vf
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) • "[T]he question
[of] whether a consent to a search was in fact •voluntary1 or was
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances." Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 227. ••A trial court's
finding of voluntary consent will not be reversed unless it is
clearly erroneous," United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130
(1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979).
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977),
the Tenth Circuit outlined the specifics necessary for the
government to sustain its burden to sh°™ *h»t voluntary consent
was given:
(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and
intelligently given"; (2) the government
must prove consent was given without
duress or coercion, express or implied;
and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights and
there must be convincing evidence that
such rights were waived.

7. The .state does not argue that Trooper Avery had probable
cause to search either the car or the suitcases. We, therefore,
need not deal with the troublesome issue of whether probable
cause to search an automobile is sufficient under the automobile
exception to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk of a
car. £££, e.g.. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (if
probable cause exists, police can search closed containers found
in vehicle); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)
(warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi
invalid); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the trunk of a
vehicle invalid); State v. Hvoh. 711 P.2d 264, 272 n.l (Utah
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (criticizing the
ROSS holding).
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Icl. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684
(10th Cir. 1962)). £££ glgp United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d
1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback.
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972,
980-81 (Utah Ct. Appl 1988).
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, the
ensuing search roust be liroited in scope to only the specific area
agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a consent search is
limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself. . . . Any
police activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect."
United States v. Gav. 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985); ££g,
6tqt# People v. Thiret. 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope of
consent exceeded when police asked to "look around" the house,
then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and
closed containers).
The trial court made the following finding on the issue of
Mr. Marshall's consent: "The Defendant consented to the search.
There was no evidence of duress or coercion." This conclusory
finding on consent is not particularly helpful in determining
whether Mr. Marshall's consent was "unequivocal and specific" as
it does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed could be
searched—the interior of the passenger compartment, the trunk,
or the locked suitcases. The relevant portions irom the
transcript of Trooper Avery's testimony are more enlightening:
Q.

What were the words he [sic] used when you asked him to
search his vehicle?

A.

I asked Mr. Marshall if—if there were any—if there was
any—were there any drugs in the vehicle, and he took
two or three seconds—no, wait a minute, I guess—I
first asked him if he was carrying any weapons and he
told me no. I then asked him if he was carrying any—if
there was any alcohol in the vehicle, he said that he
did not drink. I recall both answers were quite quick.
And then I asked him if there were any drugs in the
vehicle, he paused for, you know, probably two or three
seconds, and then told me no. I then asked him if it
would be okay if I looked in the vehicle, search the
vehicle, and he said go ahead.

Q.

Now, di4 you ask if you could look in the vehicle, or
did you ask if you could search the vehicle.

890121-CA
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A.

Well, according to this [his report], I said—I asked if
I could look in the vehicle.

Q.

So, it was "look in the vehicle"?
You didn't ask if you could open anything inside the
vehicle or anything else, did you?

A.

No.

Q.

And what happened then?

A.

Mr. Marshall just told roe, you know, he said go right
ahead. He got out, gathered up his papers and we walked
up to the front of the vehicle, and he had to open the
passenger door, as I recall.

Q.

And how did you get in the trunk?

A.

I asked him, I said—asked him if he had the key to the
trunk and he says yes, and I says—and I asked him if
he's [sic] open it, which he did, he tried. He was
extremely nervous at the time. I —

Q.

So did you open the trunk?

A.

No, sir, I did not. He—he could not—there was a
little latch over the key hole. He was shaking so hard,
he couldn't even hold the latch open, so I held the
latch up for him so he could insert the key.

Q.

And what was inside the trunk?

A.

There were four suitcases.

Q.

Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases?

A.

Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly,
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have
been in there when he rented the car.

Q.

At that point, you opened the suitcases?

0121-CA
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A.

Couldn't open them, they were padlocked shut.

Q.

So, you broke the lock?

A*

No. I—one part could zip open a little ways, and I
opened it—or unzipped it, far enough where I could see
the contents of one bag.

Q.

And you didn't ask permission to look inside the
suitcases, did you?

A.

I don't recall if I asked specifically to look inside
those/ no.

Q.

So, to look inside the suitcases, you were based on the
permission to look inside the vehicle; is that correct?

A.

Well, I retract that. His first response was clothes
when I asked him what it was, and then I asked him if I
could look in the suitcases, and he told me, well,
they're not mine, they must have been in the trunk when
I rented the car. So, yes, he did say they weren't his.

Q.

If they weren't his, how come you charged him with the
crime?

A.

He told me they weren't his, that's what he said.
said go—when I asked—

Q.

But you didn't ever get permission from him to search
the suitcases, did you? And at that point, you had them
out of the vehicle; is that correct?

A.

Uh huh (affirmative). I took one out.

Q.

And it was lockedi

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

Q.

And you had to work around the lock to look inside?

A.

Well, there was a little play in it, enough where you
could see inside.

Q.

And to look inside the suitcase, you were basing the
permission to look inside the vehicle?

A.

Yes.
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Mr. Marshall contends that Trooper Avery's request to -look
in the car" did not constitute a request to search the vehicle.
We disagree. Mr. Marshall gave his consent, although not
precisely phrased as consent "to search," then stood by while the
trooper searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
"Failure to object to the continuation of the search under these
circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was
within the scope of consent." United States v. Esoinoza, 782
F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); £££ also United States v.
Cprrgl-CQirrgl/ 702 F. Supp. 1539, 1544 (D. Wyo. 1988).
Because of our holding, we need not reach the more difficult
issue of whether Mr. Marshall^ opening the trunk constituted
implied consent to search the trunk under the totality of the
circumstances presented. See United States v. Almand, 565 F.2d
927, 930 (5th Cir.), cert, denied. 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (voluntary
consent found where defendant silently reached into his pocket,
removed key, then unlocked and opened camper door).
Mr. Marshall did not consent to Trooper Avery1s search of the
locked suitcases. The state does not argue that Mr. Marshall's
consent to search the trunk should be construed to include locked
suitcases found in the trunk.8 Rather, the state argues that
his disclaimer of ownership of the suitcases should be construed
to validate the search. We agree that Mr. Marshall made a
somewhat ambiguous disclaimer of ownership of the four suitcases
found in the trunk of the vehicle, but he did not give his
consent to their search.9 The state has not referred us to any
case where a disclaimer of ownership has been held to be a
voluntary consent to search. The cases approving the subsequent
search of a suitcase after disclaimer of ownership have all
turned on the threshold issue of standing or abandonment, not

8. Sse State v. Cffle. 31 Wash. App. 501, 643 P.2d 675 (1982),
where the defendant gave permission to search his hatchback
vehicle, but did not give consent to search the suitcases found
in the vehicle, id. at 678. The court held that the consent to
search the vehicle did not encompassed the suitcases. Id*
9. Trooper Avery believed that Mr. Marshall's denial of
ownership of the suitcases validated the search. He did what our
case law has instructed and the defect in the search was not as a
result of his actions, but rather those of the prosecutor in
failing to properly raise the issue of standing.
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consent.10 We refuse to rely on this authority as it would
allow the state to circumvent the teachings of State v.
Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), and allow the state to^
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time
on appeal by way of the back door*
In summary, we reverse the trial court1s denial of the motion
to suppress as Mr. Marshall did not consent-in-fact11 to the
search of the locked suitcases found in the trunk of his vehicle.

Judith M. Billings, Judgcr

10. See United States v. Williams. 538 F.2d 549, 550-51 (4th
Cir. 1976) (court found abandonment and held cases properly
seized when defendant denied ownership of certain cases found in
his motel room and allowed the search of the cases); United
States v. Colbert. 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (court found
abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and
began to walk away from them).
11. We do not reach the issue of the voluntariness of Mr.
Marshall's consent to the search of the car, the trunk, or the
suitcases because we find there was no consent-in-fact to the
search of the suitcases. See, e.g.. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (analysis of voluntariness of consent); State
v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (state did
not sustain its burden to prove defendant's consent was
voluntary).
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ADDENDUM C

uncmai
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
No.

vs

296-D

{Hearing)
JESUS

SEPULVEDA

Defendant,

Taken at Provo, Utah
Utah County Court House
Wednesday, October 3, 1990

Before

the Honorable: George E. Ballif

Appearances :
For

the

Plaintiff

Don Eyre
125 No, Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone:623-114 1

For

the

Defendant

Milton Harmon
36 So. Main
Nephi, Utah
84648
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3

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

3

hear

this

4

Juab County.

5

was the

in Utah County

J told you wrong.

Are you ready
the

for Millard

9

THE COURT: And Mr.

10

MR. HARMON:

11

my client.

12

note

13

continuance,

14

then he called

15

mailing

16

order stating

17

him at

18

advising

19

not

For

for

your Honor,

in the office after

and was advised
in after

address

in Salt

that address,

of the

Lake City.
for

together

to be here
I've

at 1:30, and

of

I should
the

last

continuance,

that and gave me a new

the hearing

come back, but

in the absence

today.

A copy

of

todav was mailed

the
to

with a letter*
Those

letters

had no contact

THE COURT: And he was directed

with

did

him.

to be here

it's now 2 p.m.?

23

THE COURT: All right.
want

that

Honor.

prepared

the record,

that he called

him

I'm

MR. HARMON:

25

In any event,

Harmon?

22

24

-- no,

State?
MR. EYRE: We are, your

21

County

to proceed, Mr. Eyre,

8

20

that we can

understanding.

6
7

The law stipulated

to proceed, Mr.

Yes.
I take it that

Eyre?

MR. EYRE: That
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is

correct.

RPR/CSR

you

1

THE COURT: And

the matter1 we're

2

with

is State of Utah versus Jesus A.

3

This

is a motion

4
5

proceeding

Sepulveda.

to suppress, so go right

MR. EYRE: Call Paul Mangelson

ahead.

to

the

s tand.

6

PAUL

7

being

MANGELSON

first duly sworn, was

8

and

9

testified
DIRECT

deposed

as follows:

EXAMINATION

10

BY MR. EYRE:

13

Q.

Your name is Faul

12

A.

Y e s , it is.

13

Q.

And you're a Sergeant

14

Patrol?

15

A.

Yes,

16

Q.

How many years have you been employed

17

the highway

18

A.

Just about

19

Q.

Would you relate

Mangelson?

for the Utah

Highway

lam.
with

patrol?

20

and experience

21

enforcement

24.

you've had with respect

and drug

22

A . I

23

Police Academy

24

studied

originally

25

seen what

drugs.

to the Court

training

to drug

law

identification.
attended

in 1967.
We burned

it smelled

the

the Camp

Williams

At that particular
some marijuana

time we

in class,

like, looked at it through a
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RPR/CSR

1

mi croscope .

2
3

Since
in-service

training

4 1 by new Jersey,
5

time I f ve been

that

I'm

6

training

7

job for those

8

contact

9

Q.

schools; one by New Mexico,

one by

involved

of criminal

in the Utah Highway
interdiction

Patrol

been on the

years and came

with drugs on thousands
you now

I've

of

in

occasions.

to January

30th of

10

year, were you on duty within Juab County

11

date?

on

12

A.

I was.

13

Q.

On that date did you have occasion

14

in contact

with

the defendant

15

A.

I did.

16

Q.

Where

37

A.

It occurred

did

that

at approximately

19

little bit south of Nephi.
Q.

21

Mr. Sepulveda

milepost

A . I

23

Q.

24

of that

was an

to come

lanes of

221 which

is just a

in which

occupant?

did.

Were you mobile or stationary
initial

A . I

that

place?

Did you observe a motor vehicle

22

25

take

on the northbound

1-15

this

Jesus A . Sepulveda?

contact

18

20

one

Louisianna.

23-and-a-half

Referring

to quite a few

at the

time

observation?

believe at

the initial
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observation

RPR/nsp

T was

1

s tat i onary .

2

Q.

3

Describe

what

you observed

on

occas i on.

4

A.

The vehicle had

came by me, and

5

out, caught

up with

6

had expired

registration,

7

for that

the vehicle, noticed
and stopped

Q.

Describe

9

A.

The vehicle was a red Camero

the vehicle

10

Utah plate on it, and

11

Decembei* of

12

then.
Q.

I pulled
that

the

it

vehicle

reason.

8

13

that

for

the

Court.
It had a

the plate had expired

'89, and we was

into January

of

in
f

90

Do you on a routine basis stop people

14

expired

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

What

19

A.

This was around

20

Q.

And how did you stop the

21

A.

By the use of a red

22

Q.

Upon stopping

23

contact

for

registrations?

with

24

A . I

25

Q.

issue

them

citations

for that

time of day was this; do you

the driver

10 O'clock

morning.

spotlight.

the vehicle, did you come in
of

the vehicle?

driver?
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recall?

vehicle?

did.
Who was the

in the

offense?
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1

A.

The driver' was Jesus A.

2

Q.

Were

3

there any other passengers

A.

Yes, there was.

5

Q.

Where were

6

A.

The passenger

they

located?

in the front

7

Gallegos.

8

juvenile by the name of Jose

9

13

There was a passenger

Q.
contact

11
12

Upon stopping
with

A . I

registration,
stopped

for driver's

and advised

did

coming

in

initially

do?

and

the driver why

I!d

him.
And was he able

15

A.

He gave me a temporary

16

license

that wasn't

to produce either

one?

California

valid, and he didn't

have a

reg i stra t ion.

18

Q.

Did you make an inquiry

into possession

20

A . I

did.

21

friend

22

to California

23

and

24

they'd

25

you

license

Q.

19

Barbara

in the rear, a

the vehicle and

the driver, what

asked

was

Santos.

14

17

in the

vehi c1e?

4

10

Sepulveda.

of this particular
He stated

in California.

on Friday night

Q.

that

Was he able

to a

they had

in a pick-up

in California,

this car from a friend

down

RPR/CSR

gone

truck,
and

there.

to tell you the name or
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came

vehicle?

the car belonged

He said

it had broke down, down
got

as to how he

the

address

of this

A.
asked
and

friend?

No, he couldn't.

him

I asked

that.

if he'd give me the name of the

the address, and he couldn't
Q.

him

And

friend

do either

there was no registration

I

one.

in the

vehi cle?
A.

There was

Q.

Did he have any permission

written
the

not.

authorization

that he was

slip or any

in possession

of

vehicle?
A.

No, he didn't.

Q.

After you'd

the driver, what
A.

and

California

on

that

she had
just

Utah, and

from

I asked

she was a friend

her

of

just gone along

to

for the ride.

The

16 years old, and he was a

of the driver's.

in California,

this information

you do?

that

this trip

rear passenger was

nothing.

to the one occupant.

She explained

the driver

friend

obtained

then did

I talked

for ID.

He had

also.

they really

they was even coming

Yet

Both had

the same

they were coming

couldn't

You made an inquiry of

A.

I did.

Q.

And

they didn't
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back

give me a reason

back to Utah.

Q.

address

that?

have a reason?

RFR/CSR

to
why

A.

No .

Q.

With respect

does he speak
A.

to driver Jesus

Sepulveda,

English?

He spoke

fairly good English, yes.

Anytime he had a problem understanding
said, the girl would
very

interpret

for him, which

was

seldom.
Q.

After you made

p a s s e n g e r s , what
A.

the inquiry of the

then did you

An observation

the more T asked

that T ! d

made during

him questions about

why he was coming

back

n e r v o u s , obviously
shaking, and
extremely
Q.

it was obvious

A.

extremely

His hands were

visibly

to me that he was

nervous.
And after you've made those

observations,
to the

of the vehicle or -The interior was quite cluttered

it appeared
Other

and

the car and

you didn't make any other observations
interior

all

I talked

to Utah, he became

nervous.

two

do?

this time I was talking, that the more

had

anything I

that

they'd been

than that, no other

living

up, and

in the car.

observations,

Q.

And what

A.

I asked him why he was so nervous;

contraband

then did you do?

in his car that he was afraid

BFVRPT.V

r.nwt?

if he
I was

1U

1

going

to find.

2

could

search

3

drugs, and he said,

4
5

Q.
this

He said

the car for
"Go

Was he still

no.

Then

I asked

this -- guns or alcohol

in the vehicle when you

Yes, everyone was still

7

Q.

And after he gave you consent

the vehicle, what
A.

in the

I had all

11

weapons, patted

32

passenger

13

pipe or a small

14

back pocke t.

15

Q.

Did he give any explanation

16

A.

Yeah, he said h e f d

19
20

I checked

the two male

them down.

in the rear

In doing

device

so, on

the

for
the

marijuana

in the

found

exit

individuals

I found a small

smoking

passenger's

for

that?

it on the

streets

in fcc^s Angeles.
Q.

After you found

item, what
A . I

then did you
proceeded

21

asked about

22

the key

23

with a screwdriver.

24

opened

25

to search

three of the occupants

vehicle,

18

vehicle,

then did you do?

10

17

had

conversation?
A.

9

or

ahead,"

6

8

if I

Q.

particular

do?

to search

the vehicle.

the trunk, and he said he didn't

for the trunk.

the

those -- that

He said he could

He got a screwdriver

trunk.

He did

that

himself?

o o o / nCP

I
have

open it
out

and

2 J

I

1

A.

He did

that himself, yes.

2

broke

the lock on the

3

mean, he was

4

was nothing

5

this was a rouse, you know,

6

had nothing.

7

nothing

8

he'd

9

check

that

intent

there.

I felt

Just

Cameros

11

where

12

hiding place

13

Q.

in the back

Have you

found

those compartments

15

occasions

was

after
to

I've

there's a pretty

I know

good

he seats.

contraband

concealed

seats on

in

other

Cameros?

A.

Yes, I have.

17

Q.

How many

18

A.

Oh, several

19

Q.

After you felt

other examination
A . I

there

the seats.

of

--

to show me that he

I then proceeded

in the bucket

16

21

just

I

there

on quite a few occasions and

14

20

me that

the trunk and

I felt

there's a -- that

in

it for me.

to go along with him,

the interior.

checked

actually

like he was really

the trunk open.

10

to open

on showing

I did check

there.

broke

trunk

He

did.

times?
times.
them,

did you make

of the screws on the
Generally

22

seats

together, and

23

you can usually

24

on this occasion, but

25

there's

seats?

you can just squeeze

if there's anything

feel

it.

I could not

I noticed

two screws at the bottom

BEVERLY LOWE

any

in

feel

the screws

there
anything
—

that hold a

RPR/CSR

the

1

plastic

backing

2

these screws were marked

3

been taken

4

decided

5

1ook.

in and out

to go ahead

6

Q.

7

your vehicle

8
9

Phillips

or

on several

and remove

and

don't

inside were

11

contained

12

I'm

remember
and

Q . I

them and

So, I

from

for sure, but

I did

I removed

two screws,

—

the

packages

aluminum

foil

get a

that

is what

to say.
show you what's been marked

Exhibit

No. 1 and

15

A.

Yes, I have.

16

Q.

What

17

A.

Those are the two items

are

ask

if you've seen

from

the back seat, also

19

from

the young boy's back

those

Exhibit

22

that photograph

State's
items?

the pipe

that were

removed

that was

removed

pocket.

show you what's been marked

21

as

they?

18

Q . I

they'd

take a

a screwdriver

14

20

that

occasions.

two Reynolds wrapped

white material

trying

that

—

screwdriver,

10

I noticed

up, indicating

And did you retrieve

A . I

13

on the seats, and

No. 3, a photograph,

as

State's

and ask if you've

s^en

before?

23

A.

Yes, I have.

24

Q.

Do you know what

25

A.

This depicts

BEVERLY

it

depicts?

the back seat

LOWE
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of the

Camero

13

3

after

I'd

2

and raised

3

taken the two screws out of the
up the plastic

backing.

THE COURT: Could
that's ready

bottom

I interrupt

you.

4

got a jury

5

get you to just kind of move back, and could

6

step down, Officer Mangelson.

7

maybe

8

the hall or what have you, you may, or you may

9

in the courtroom.

10 or 15 m i n u t e s .

10

think, to get

31

(Hearing

12

Q.

to come back*

I've

then resumed

after

14

Exhibit

15

depi cts?

as

17

Camero showing

18

deca1 on it.

19

Q.

20

wrapped

21

A.

This depicts

After you found
packages
Arrested

22

possession

23

their Miranda

24

pictures of the car.

25

also.

the two aluminum

of a controlled

expired

foil

for

substance, told

rights, and proceeded
I called

to

for some

BPP/HSP

the

then did you du?

three individuals

BEVERLY LOWE

of

that has an

in the seat, what
all

that

the back-end

the Utah plate

this

State's

No. 2 and ask if you know what

Yes.

stay

interruption)

BY MR. EYRE: Sergeant M a n g e l s o n , at

time I show you what's been marked

A.

in

here.

13

16

to go out

take us a few m i n u t e s , I

the -- everybody

recessed

you

It won't be but

If you want

It will

If I could

them of

take
backup

1
2

Q.

Did you conduct

an inventory

search

vehi cle?

3

A.

Yes, I did.

4

Q.

Did you find any other contraband

5

to that

6

A.

7

10

The only other

Q . I
and

contraband

small amount

of

Did you

find

I did.

12

Q.

Where was it

13

A.

It was

located

a small amount

15

it that appeared

to be

the

18

State's Exhibit
A.

Yes, I did.

20

Q.

And

23

A.
crime

the
on

of

these

the items contained

in

No. 1?

19

22

of

of white powder

time of the arrest

individuals, did you seize

then you had

and possession

part

cocaine.

17

21

time?

in the front

vehicle, and had

At

in that

located?

14

Q.

No. 1 again,

contained

that at that

A.

found

marijuana.

to you a tissue

11

16

that was

show you State's Exhibit

indicate

also.

pursuant

search?

was a very

8
9

of the

since that

Yes, except

for

them

in your sole

control

time?
the times they were at

the

lab.

24

Q.

You've had

25

at the crime

the items in Exhibit

lab; is that

BEVERLY LOWE

correct?

RPR/CSR

1 analyzed

1

A.

Yes, I have.

2

Q.

I show you what's been marked

3

Exhibit

4

before?

5

A.

Yes, I have.

6

Q.

What

is it?

7

A.

This

is the analysis

8

crime

10

No. 4 and ask you if you've seen

results

For

the items contained

from

the

in State's

A.

Exhibit

Yes.

12

MR. EYRE: I ha*e no further

13

THE COURT: Mr.
CROSS

14
BY MR.

EXAMINATION

HARMON:

Q.

17

were on 1-15

18

comes by you, and you pulled

19

Could you tell us why you decided

20

car?
A.

questions.

Harmon?

16

21

that

No . 1?

1 1

15

State's

lab.
Q.

9

as

Officer Mangleson, you
by milepost

The occupants

This red
out and

appeared

22

me, as they

come by me.

23

take a second

24

Q.

Were

25

A.

Yes, they were.

look at

221.

indicated

BEVERLY LOWE

you

Camero

followed

to follow

it.

the

to be very young

I simply

pulled

them.

they all

that

hispanic?

RPR/CSR

out

to

to

1
2

Q.

In your drug

have a loose profile

interdiction
that you

3

A.

Do we have a what?

4

Q.

A loose

5

A . I

6

Q.

7

that

8
9
10
11

you

A.

14

other kind

18

Q.

A.

been one of

up about

of vehicle

every

kind

21

in various

22

those

of -- every

as this vehicle was

traveling
going?

them going both ways,

You have had prior experience

Camero-type

vehicles hauling
compartments

that

narcotics,

goes south.
with
apparently,

can be opened

up in

cars?

23

A.

That's

24

Q.

You indicated

defendant,

I

also.

but as a rule, drugs go north and money
Q.

hispanics

up a lot of Cameros, yes.

Well, we've caught

20

25

in

narcotics.

automobile

And are they generally

northbound

19

fit

vehicles?

We've picked

think we've picked

17

things would

up hauling

Has a Camero-type

13

16

that.

Well, there have been a lot of

the favori te-type

15

it

tell us what

have been picked
Q.

12

call

profile?
A.

that

use?

profile.

guess you could

Could

work, do you

correct.
that as you stopped

he showed you a temporary

BEVERLY LOWE

RPR/CSR

the

California

17

1

license.

What was it that made that not

2

A.

3

it was valid

4

to be accompanied

by a California

5

18 years or older

to make this license

6
7

Q.

It was a temporary

N o , they did not.

9

Q.

Okay.

persons?

A.

I did.

12

Q.

Okay.

Were

there any of them

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Who was the ; ?

16

A.

Miss Gallegos w a s .

17

Q.

Okay.

18

registration

19

licensed

You

indicated

that

were

car;

is that

was no

right?

A.

Yes, it was.

21

Q.

Were you able to check

22

on the registration

23

had a valid
A.

ther<

in the vehicle, but it was a Utah

20

25

that

21 years of age?

14

24

valid.

Did you check i^n that with each of

11

over

driver

license?

A.

13

licensed

He had

And did anyone else in the car have a

valid California driver's

the other

instruction p e r m i t , and

for a certain number of days.

8

10

valid?

through your

on the car to find out

registration

from

BEVERLY LOWF.

if it

somewhere?

As I recall, this vehicle was

to a Mary Espinoza

radio

the Salt

registered

Lake area,

P D © /nee

if I

1

recall.

2

Q.

3

to find

4

like

A.

6

stolen.

7

Q.
speak

out

there any attempt

There had been no report

As you talked

to you

in Spanish

10

Q.

Okay.

anything

There were occasions when

A.

There was, yes.

14

Q.

Were you able

15

they were saying

16

Spanish?
No.

18

Q.

Did soifre of that

19

time when you talked with

20

interior

23

sure

of the
I don't

Q.

for you;

it was

that

they spoke

interpreting
them about

in

go on at

examining

the
the

car?
recall

times, though,

that he

what

to each other when

A.

The main

he

you had

interpreting

to detect

17

22

did

right?

13

A.

on the car as

English.

to have Miss Gallegos do some

12 1 is that

25

her

mostly?

No, he spoke mostly

24

or

with Mr. Sepulveda,

A.

21

to contact

if the car had been stolen

9

11

made

that?

5

8

Was

exactly which
I checked

times

with her

it was.
to make

understood.

And was there also a use of her as an

interpreter

when you asked

BEVERLY LOWE

them

to get

RPR/CSR

out of

the

1 9

I

1

car?

2

A.

I don't

3

Q.

How about when you asked

4

trunk

of the

recall

A.

1 don't

6

Q.

Is it possible

the trunk,

8

out of your

recall

that

10

Q.

And so, he would

33

is possible,

Basically.
to break

I asked
into

him

How was he

15

A.

To tell you the truth,

I don't believe

18

Q.

I have a record

Is it possible

to open

I don't
of

that he was

the

trunk

remember.

it.
there without a

coa t on?
A.

That's possible, yes.

20

Q.

Maybe even been

like

in a T-shirt

or

something

that?

22

A.

That

23

Q.

And do you recall what

24

like on this

25

screwdriver?

dressed?

19

21

the

it.

Q.

17

screwdriver

have been opening

14

16

open

yes.

trunk at your direction with your

and he had

them

car?

That

A.

the

either.

that you provided "him the

A.

12

to open

that as you had

9

11

them

car?

5

7

that.

A . I

is possible.
the weather

was

day?

don't

have a record

BFVFPT.V

r nwt?

of it, but

I would

1

imagine

2

Q,

3

about

it was cool, being

Was there any detectable

the
A . I

5

Q.

don't recall
Now, you've

6

inventory

7

small amuujn

8

A.
aluminum

10
11

Q.

odor of

any, no.

indicated

that you did

of marijuana.

Located

Where was that

foil.
Then you found

a tissue with some
to be cocaine

That's

13

Q.

Where was that

14

A.

In the front part of the vehicle.

15

Q.

Do you remember

correct.
located?

if it was by the

dashboard

seat?

17

A.

As I recall, it was on the

18

Q.

Did you have

order

cocaine

in it?

A.

19

located?

on the rear floor in a piece of

residue, or what appeared

or on the

an

search of the vehicle and you found a

12

16

marijuana

vehicle?

4

9

in January.

to see the

dashboard.

to open the tissue up in

contents?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

The marijuana

that was in the back, was

22

that -- did you have to open the aluminum

23

in order

to see

foil up

that?

24

A.

Y e s , you did.

25

Q.

Apparently,

from your

RFVERLY LOWE

training

RPR/CSR

and

21
1

experience,

2

smoked

3

that;

in the vehicle, you would have
is that

4

A . I

5

Q.

6

within

7

would

the last

A.

detected

think so, yes.
I say

"recently,"

five or six

that may

days?

I think

that's all

THE COURT: Mr. Eyre, anything

11

MR. EYRE: A couple

12

RE-DIRECT

14

I have,

Honor.

10

13

be

Yes.
MR. HARMON:

your

recently

right?

And when

8
9

if there had been marijuana

BY MR.

last

further?

questions.

EXAMINATION

EYRE:

Q.

Sergeant

15

ownership

16

computer

17

arrest

Mangelson,

with respect

of the vehicle, did you

to

check —

run a

check on that vehicle before or after

of the

the

individuals?

18

A.

It was

after.

19

Q.

So, you had no knowledge

20

was stolen or not prior

21

individuals;

22

A.

No, I d i d n 1 t .

23

Q.

And at that

24

whether

they were

25

vehicle

or not;

is that

as to whether

to the arrest

of

the

correct?

time you had no

in rightful

is that

BEVERLY LOWF

knowledge

possession

correct?

*>»» <«~-

of

the

it

1

A.

No , I did not .

2

Q.

After

3

you have any

4

Barbara

A . I

6

Q.
that

conversation with

What

passenger

did she say and what did you say at

time?
A.

9

record?

10

Q.

Yes.

11

A.

She handed

She handed

—

do we want

on it, and

told me to call

13

individual

who

14

you?"

15

for DEA, and

16

this

17

and

18

in the car, but

19

were.

I had

this part

me a note with a phone

12

that number

stopped.

I said,

of

that

individual.

she had gone

and

tell

"Who

she was quite certain
that

that

that point

I didn't

21

was pulling

my leg or what

22

So, I still

just

23

same as anybody

considered

with

narcotics

know where

they

know whether

the circumstances

she
was.

her a -- basically

the

else in the car.

Later on I did confirm
told me was

agent

confidence,

there was

she didn't

At

his

the

are

to California

She had gained

the

number

She told me that she was an undercover

20

25

the

did

did.

8

24

of the individuals,

Gal legos?

5

7

the arrest

that what

true.

BEVERLY LOWE ---

RPR/CSR

she had

23
1
2

Q.

That

she was assisting

investigation;

3

A.

That's

is that

correct.

MR. EYRE: Nothing

5

THE COURT: Anything

7

RE-CROSS
BY MR.

8
9
10

that

In relationship
up the back seat

you had
A.

Prior

12

Q.

Was it prior

to the time when

to

to the time when you'd

they'd

A . I

turned
believe

that appeared

that

I had noticed

as if

them prior

to

that .
MR. HARMON:

18

MR. EYRE: Nothing

19

THE COURT: You can step down.

20

MR. EYRE: We would
your

That's all

I have, your

Honor.

further.

offer

Thank

you.

the exhibits,

Honor.

22

THE COURT: They'll

23

MR. HARMON:

25

seen

with a screwdriver?

17

24

Gallegos?

that.

14

been

you

of the car, when was it

the screws on the back seat

21

Harmon?

EXAMINATION

13

16

on that, Mr.

the conversation with Miss

11

15

further.

HARMON:

Q.
opened

in an

correct?

4

6

the DEA

of saving

be

received.

No objection

for the

purpose

time.
MR. EYRE: Do you want

BEVERLY LOWE

to examine

ppp/neo

them?

1
?

THE COURT: I assume they're what
represent

3
Court

5

way of

confirming

isn't

cocaine by

not competent

to do

that.
Okay, do you have anything
want

to present?

I guess there

else

that

isn't much

MR. HARMON: N o , your Honor.

12

memorandum

13

addition

34

and deliver

15

that

you

that

I've

-- the facts

prepared

I'll

in it from

.it to the Court

THE COURT: Okay.
yours

and

put

the

this day's

hearing

Tuesday?
Do you want

in at the appropriate

I do have a

to send

time?

17

MR. HARMON: Okay.

18

THE COURT: Fine; and you'll have how

19

MR. E Y R E : I'll

20

you

can, huh?

11

16

the cocaine

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm

8

10

that

the

testimony.

6

9

to be.

MF . HARMON: I don't suppose we'd want

4

7

them

you

Ten days after

that?
long?

have it to the Court

Tuesday.

21

THE COURT: Okay-

22

receive yours.

23

take

24

memorandum

25

(Court

All right,

it under advisement,

So, ten days after

you

fine.

I'll

then.

Thank you.
Wait

and we'll be in recess.

in recess)

BEVERLY LOWE

RPR/CSR

for

the

25

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss .

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

I, Beverly A. Lowe, Certified

Shorthand

Reporter and Notary Public for the State of Utah,
cerify :
That I am an official court reporter in.
the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of
Utah;
That I was present during the entire
proceedings in the before entitled cause; that the
proceedings were reported stenographically by me,
and were therafter transcribed; that said transript
constitutes to the best of my ability, a true and
complete record of the proceedings had.

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have subscribed
my name and affixed my seal this 17TH day of
October, 1990
^

^?«.-^A.Le**\* ^ Beverly^ A . Lowe, CSR/RPR
UT
pnwo,
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;;-VJ N O T A R Y
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ADDENDUM D

FILFP
TEC 1 1 1?£3
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

* rU'uriActt,C •

**********

STATE OF UTAH,

Casxfe Number:

Plaintiff,
vs.

296-D

DECISION
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE

JESUS A. SEPULVEDA,
Defendant.
**********

The motion of the defendant to suppress evidence obtained
from a vehicle driven by the defendant which was stopped by
Trooper Mangelson near Nephi, Juab County, Utah, came before the
Court for hearing on October 3, 1990, by stipulation of counsel,
the defendant having heretofore waived his rights to a speedy
trial.
The State presented its evidence through Trooper
Mangelson, with certain stipulations as to the contraband found in
the vehicle driven by the defendant identifying it as one kilo of
cocaine.

The Trooper gave the only testimony presented at the

hearing with reference to the circumstances of the stop, the
warrant less search of the vehicle, and all other surrounding
facts and circumstances observed and participated in by the
Trooper and defendant and those in the vehicle driven by the
defendant.

n r\

' ,'

From the testimony given it appears that the following
facts are those testified to by the Trooper and not contested by
any other witness since no one else was called by the State or the
defendant.
Trooper Mangelson testified that he first observed the
defendant vehicle which was a Camaro (a stylish General Motor
sports car) but that it had an expired Utah registration.

Upon

effecting the stop the officer asked the defendant for a driver's
license and registration which the defendant was unable to
produce.

The defendant claimed the vehicle belonged to his friend

an* was being used to return to Utah since the vehicle they went
to California in broke down.

The defendant could not give a name

of his friend who owed the vehicle nor an address.
The officer noted that as the conversation with defendant
extended he observed the defendant reacting in a very nervous and
visibly shaking manner.

After being asked if the vehicle was

carrying any drugs or firearms and responding no# the trooper
asked if he could search the vehicle to which he said go ahead.
The officer requested the passengers to exit the vehicle
at which time they did and he frisked them for weapons, and found
a small marijuana pipe in the pocket of a juvenile who was a
passenger in the vehicle.

The defendant did not have a key to the

trunk but got access to it for the search through use of a screw
driver.

While searching the vehicle the officer noted screws that

had paint wear marks on them indicating some form of recent use

it

and lead to the discovery of a compartment under the seat wherein
one kilo of cocaine was retrieved.
It is also noted that the testimony presented by the
trooper was to the effect that a women passenger in the subject
vehicle had taken the trooper aside and indicated to him that she
was an agent for the D.E.A. and that there was contraband in the
car after which the officer proceeded to the discovery through the
compartment under the seat to whir . access was obtained through
use of the screwdriver on the wore screws.
The two paramounts considerations that this set of facts
give rise to are whether or not there was probable cause for the
stop of the vehicle, and a subsequent search of it.

There is also

an issue to whether or not the defendant under the circumstances
of this case had any standing to object to the officer searching
the vehicle aside from the probable cause question, and lastly
whether or not a consent was obtained to search the vehicle by the
trooper from the defendant.
The Court concludes that the facts in this case support
the right of the trooper to proceed with a search of the vehicle
under all of the above issues.
As to the initial stop of the vehicle, the only testimony
presented indicates that t&cre was no valid Utah registration
presented for the car which showed a violation of the registration
laws which justified the officer in making the stop which would
not be unreasonable under the circumstances of the expired

13.

registration observed by the officer.

The fact that after the

stop the defendant could not produce a drivers license nor could
he give any ownership information other than that it was a friends
car whose name he could not give nor whose address he could give
would justify the officer in proceeding with additional questions
which the uncontraverted testimony shows that consent was given
for the vehicle search and no evidence would support a showing of
the consent being coerced or in any manner otherwise unlawfully
obtained.
It would appear that the totality of circumstances after
the initial stop and learning from a third party in the vehicle
who was identified as a D.E.A. operative was a direct statement to
the officer that there was contraband in the vehicle which
occurred prior to obtaining the consent or at least proceeding
with the search would certainly give probable cause under exigent
circumstances, the detention being on a highway some distance from
a source for obtaining a search warrant would certainly give
probable cause to the officer to proceed.

The fact that the

consent was given would clearly confirm the actions of the officer
in going into areas that he deemed suspicious within the car in
locating the contraband.
Based on the foregoing analysis on the basis of evidence
presented only by the trooper, there has been no showing that the
search was unreasonable, and to the contrary it appears that the
records shows it to be a reasonable search tinder the circumstances

'15

presented by this case.
Defendant's motion to suppress is denied, trial in this
matter is set for the 29th day of January 1991, at 10:00

a.m.

o'clock or the follow the regular law and motion calendar in
Nephi, Utah.
Dated t h i s

<6

day of H b ^ f i 6 l f e $ t 9 9 0 .
BY THE COURT

GEORGE^E. BALLIF, JUDG^

cc:

counsel
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